Opinion 13 February 2026

Rethinking the EU Chips Act: Europe Should Strengthen Its Strategic Assets Instead of Subsidizing National Champions

Foto: Der ifo-Präsident Prof. Clemens Fuest
Share article
Share article

As geopolitical tensions rise and supply chains become increasingly politicized, Europe’s dependence on imported semiconductors has moved to the center of policy debates. The EU Chips Act was designed to address this vulnerability by strengthening Europe’s role in the global semiconductor ecosystem. Yet several years into the initiative, it is becoming clear that it has been a failure. First of all, the Act had little European content. In essence, it allowed some large Member States to provide large subsidies to their national champions, without any clear EU value added.

Not All Chips Are the Same

An important point often overlooked in political discussions is that not all chips are the same. Semiconductor markets differ sharply depending on application, technology node, and end use. Treating “chips” as a single strategic category risks misdirecting public funds and obscuring Europe’s existing strengths.

For Europe, the largest demand for semiconductors comes from the automotive and industrial sectors. Producing these kinds of chips is highly competitive and European firms such as Infineon and STMicroelectronics already play a strong role. Their business models are mature, innovation incentives are well established, and research and development is closely tied to customer needs. 

 

It is not obvious why further public subsidies for incremental advances in automotive and industrial chips are necessary. 

 

The situation is very different when it comes to the newest generation of so-called logic chips, such as 2-nanometre processors used in artificial intelligence, high-performance computing, and defense applications. Here, the United States dominates chip design, while production is heavily concentrated in Taiwan. It would take massive resources to break into either of these two markets.

The Chips Act Would Need to Support R&D Strategically

To gain a foothold in chip design, the Chips Act would have to support R&D in this area. But this is not attractive for national policymakers who want to break ground on big visible projects. Only an insignificant fraction of the billions spent under the Chips Act went to design.

Fabrication of advanced chips is characterized by massive economies of scale and the need for a supporting supply chain. 

 

Starting new mega projects is a losing proposition as the fate of the Intel project in Germany shows. 

 

There is already one plant in Europe where advanced node chips are currently being produced. But it is located in a small country – Ireland. It would have been possible to upgrade this existing facility for much smaller sums, but policymakers in France, Germany and Italy preferred to spend their money at home. 

Calls to increase large-scale production of advanced chips in Europe should, in any case, be treated with caution. Around 75 per cent of global semiconductor trade flows to just eight countries, while Europe accounts for only about 5 percent. Expanding fabrication capacity in Europe would therefore primarily serve export markets. That would not reduce critical dependencies of the EU on others.

The EU Should Leverage Its Existing Strengths

Instead, Europe may be better served by leveraging its existing strength as a global supplier of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. A Dutch company, ASML, is the sole supplier of the advanced machines needed to produce advanced node chips. This position gives the EU significant strategic power, both vis-à-vis China and the US. Both need ASML machines to build up their own production capacity in advanced nodes. Here again, policymakers in France and Germany ignored this European strategic asset in favor of their national champions. Instead, they should have concentrated scarce resources on less glamorous projects to strengthen the European supply chain in this area.

A more focused Chips Act – one that prioritizes advanced R&D and plays to Europe’s real comparative advantages – would strengthen resilience and give the EU an important geopolitical bargain ‘chip’.

 

Oliver Falck
Director of the ifo Center for the Economics of Innovation and Digital Transformation
Professor of Economics, esp. Empirical Innovation Economics, University of Munich (LMU)

Clemens Fuest
Professor of Economics and Public Finance, LMU Munich
President of the ifo Institute 

Daniel Gros
Director of the Institute for European Policymaking at Bocconi University

 

Similarly published under the title "Europas teurer Chip-Irrweg – nur so befreien wir uns aus der Abhängigkeit", Focus online, 12 February, 2026.

 

Contact

CV Foto von Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Clemens Fuest
ifo

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Clemens Fuest

Executive Board
President
+49(0)89/9224-1430
View Profile
CV Foto von Prof. Dr. Oliver Falck
ifo

Prof. Dr. Oliver Falck

ifo Center for the Economics of Innovation and Digital Transformation
Director of the ifo Center for the Economics of Innovation and Digital Transformation, Program Director, CESifo Research Network
+49(0)89/9224-1370
View Profile