Opinion 8 October 2025

The Hidden Multi Billion Euro Costs of Germany’s Pension Package

Foto: Der ifo-Präsident Prof. Clemens Fuest
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The German government’s draft law to stabilize the pension level at a benchmark of 48 percent – while also extending the Mütterrente III (Mothers’ Pension III) to women whose children were born before 1992 – will lead to substantial additional expenditure for the statutory pension insurance system in the years ahead. 

To prevent contribution rates for employers and employees from rising, the federal government plans to increase its subsidy to the pension fund. In the case of Mütterrente III, this follows established practice: benefits not directly related to insurance contributions are financed from general taxation rather than from contributions by the insured. That does not make the costs disappear. The new mothers’ pension will initially burden the federal budget by about five billion euros, tapering in subsequent years. By 2031 the cumulative bill will amount to roughly 20 billion euros, and by 2040 to about 60 billion.

The Pension Package Changes the Arithmetic

The 48 percent safeguard line, however, is not about non insurance benefits. It is part of the arithmetic that determines increases in pension payments within the statutory pension formula. Pension benefits rise in line with gross wages, adjusted by two correction factors – a contribution rate factor and a sustainability factor. The contribution rate factor reduces the increase in pension payments when the contribution rate to the system rises; the sustainability factor dampens increases when the ratio of pensioners to contributors deteriorates.

Both factors ensure that pension payments grow more slowly than gross wages, which is necessary because the number of retirees is rising while the number of contributors is shrinking. Owing to the legally mandated pension guarantee, benefits cannot fall in nominal terms.

A safeguard line at 48 percent initially says little about the actual level of pension payments. It defines the ratio of pension benefits to the earnings of a model retiree with forty five years of contributions. The wage orientation built into the formula ensures that retirees share in labor income and productivity gains. Over the medium term, earnings tend to grow faster than inflation, more than offsetting any loss of purchasing power.

Pension Payments on Autopilot

Extending the 48 percent floor until 2031 means these correction factors will temporarily cease to operate – pensions will rise automatically with gross wages. At first, the effect will be modest, but without the safeguard the pension level would fall to about 47 percent by 2031. According to the draft bill, the federal subsidy will therefore have to increase by around nine billion euros starting in 2028, by some 13 billion in 2030, and by 15 billion in 2031. The Bundesrechnungshof (Federal Office of Audit) estimates that, by 2040, the cumulative cost could reach 145 billion euros – roughly 10 billion a year.

A Technical Trick Worth 15 Billion a Year

One clause in the draft carries particularly weighty consequences. Although the 48 percent safeguard is to expire after 2031, future pension increases are to be calculated from the higher level it creates. Under current law, the starting point from 2032 would have been 47 percent. Locking in 48 percent instead adds an enduring burden of about 15 billion euros a year. This technical maneuver in the draft from German Labor Minister Lisa Paus’s team would create a large, permanent fiscal liability – none of which was foreseen in the coalition agreement.

The bill would also change how the federal subsidy to the pension fund is calculated. At present, the transfer rises when gross wages or contribution rates increase, keeping the tax financed share of pension funding stable.

Shifting the Burden to Taxpayers – and to the Young

Under the proposal, the federal government would reimburse the difference between the hypothetical expenditures of the pension system without the safeguard and the actual, higher expenditures with it. In effect, this would make it easier for future governments to expand tax financing of pensions and to weaken the insurance principle that benefits should correspond to contributions. The disciplining effect of limiting tax subsidies would disappear. Rising tax burdens would weigh on economic growth – and on younger generations already facing the demographic bill.

Adding to the imbalance, the safeguard line still refers to a “model” retiree with forty five contribution years, even though the transition to a retirement age of sixty seven will be complete by 2031. Logically, the benchmark should be updated to forty seven years, which would delay its binding effect. The draft does not provide for this.

Given the fiscal magnitude, the German parliament should recognize the significance of these seemingly technical provisions and correct them. Otherwise, Germany risks locking in obligations that will further aggravate the federal budget’s already foreseeable financing problems.

 

Lars P. Feld
Professor of Economic Policy, University of Freiburg
Director, Walter Eucken Institute


Clemens Fuest
Professor of Economics and Public Finance, LMU Munich
President, ifo Institute

Adapted from an article first published as “Versteckte Milliardenkosten des Rentenpakets,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 6, 2025.

 

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